Should editors of scientific journals practice triple-blind reviewing?
Introduction
Journal editors occupy an important position in the scientific landscape. By making the final decision on which papers get published in their journal and which papers do not, they have a significant influence on what work is given attention and what work is ignored in their field (Crane 1967) .
In this paper I investigate the following question: should the editor be informed about the identity of the author when she is deciding whether to publish a particular paper? Under a single-or double-blind reviewing procedure, the editor has access to information about the author, whereas under a triple-blind reviewing procedure she does not. So in other words the question is: should journals practice triple-blind reviewing?
Two kinds of arguments have been given in favor of triple-blind reviewing. One focuses on the treatment of the author by the editor. On this kind of argument, revealing identity information to the editor will lead the editor to (partially) base her judgment on irrelevant information (such as the gender of the author, or whether or not the editor is friends with the author). This harms the author, and is thus bad.
The second kind of argument focuses on the effect on the journal and its readers. Again, the idea is that the editor will base her judgment on identity information if given the chance to do so. But now the further claim is that as a result the journal will accept worse papers. After all, if a decision to accept or reject a paper is influenced by the editor's biases, this suggests that a departure has been made from a putative "objectively correct" decision. This harms the readers of the journal, and is thus bad.
Here I provide a philosophical discussion of the reviewing procedure to assess these arguments. I distinguish between two different ways the editor's judgment may be affected if the author's identity is revealed to her. First, the editor may treat authors she knows differently from authors she does not know. Second, the editor may treat authors differently based on their membership of some group (e.g., gender bias). My discussion focuses on the following three claims.
My first claim is that the first kind of differential treatment the editor may display (based on whether she knows a particular author) actually benefits rather than harms the readers of the journal. This benefit is the result of a reduction in editorial uncertainty about the quality of submitted papers when she knows their authors. I construct a model to show in a formally precise way how such a benefit might arise-surprisingly, no assumption that the scientists the editor knows are somehow "better scientists" is required-and I cite empirical evidence that such a benefit indeed does arise. However, this benefit only applies in certain fields. I argue that in other fields (in particular, mathematics and the humanities) no significant reduction of uncertaintyand hence no benefit to the readers-occurs (section 2).
My second claim is that either kind of differential treatment the editor may display (based on whether she knows authors or based on bias against certain groups) harms authors. I argue that any instance of such differential treatment constitutes an epistemic injustice in the sense of Fricker (2007) against the disadvantaged author. If the editor is to be (epistemically) just, she should prevent such differential treatment, which can be done through triple-blind reviewing. So I endorse an argument of the first of the two kinds I identified above: triple-blind reviewing is preferable because not doing so harms authors (section 3).
My third claim is that whether differential treatment also harms the journal and its readers depends on a number of factors. Differential treatment by the editor based on whether she knows a particular author may benefit readers, whereas differential treatment based on bias against certain groups may harm them. Whether there is an overall benefit or harm depends on the strength of the editor's bias, the relative sizes of the different groups, and other factors, as I illustrate using the model. As a result I do not in general endorse the second kind of argument, that triple-blind reviewing is preferable because readers of the journal are harmed otherwise. However, I do endorse this argument for fields like mathematics and the humanities, where I claim that the benefits of differential treatment (based on uncertainty reduction) do not apply (section 4).
Note that, in considering the ethical and epistemic effects of triple-blind reviewing, a distinction is made between the effects on the author and the effects on the readers of the journal. This reflects a growing understanding that in order to study the social epistemology of science, what is good for an individual inquirer must be distinguished from what is good for the wider scientific community (Kitcher 1993 , Strevens 2003 , Mayo-Wilson et al. 2011 .
Zollman (2009) has studied the effects of different editorial policies on the number of papers published and the selection criteria for publication, but he does not focus specifically on the editor's decisions and the uncertainty she faces. Economists have studied models in which editor decisions play an important role (Ellison 2002 , Faria 2005 , Besancenot et al. 2012 ), but they have not distinguished between papers written by scientists the editor knows and papers by scientists unknown to her, and neither have they been concerned with biases the editor may be subject to. And some other economists have done empirical work investigating the differences between papers with and without an author-editor connection (Laband and Piette 1994 , Medoff 2003 , Smith and Dombrowski 1998 , more on this later), but they do not provide a model that can explain these differences. This paper thus fills a gap in the literature.
A Model of Editor Uncertainty
As I said in the introduction, journal editors have a certain measure of power in a scientific community because they decide which papers get published.
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An editor could use this discretionary power to the benefit of her friends or 1 Different journals may have different policies, such as one in which associate editors make the final decision for papers in their (sub)field. Here, I simply define "the editor" to be whomever makes the final decision whether to publish a particular paper.
colleagues, or to promote certain subfields or methodologies over others. This phenomenon has been called editorial favoritism. If anecdotal evidence is to be believed, this phenomenon is widespread. Some systematic evidence of favoritism exists as well. Bailey et al. (2008a,b) find that academics believe editorial favoritism to be fairly prevalent, with a nonnegligible percentage claiming to have perceived it firsthand. Laband (1985) and Piette and Ross (1992) find that, controlling for citation impact and various other factors, papers whose author has a connection to the journal editor are allocated more journal pages than papers by authors without such a connection.
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In this paper, I refer to the phenomenon that editors are more likely to accept papers from authors they know than papers from authors they do not know as connection bias.
Academics tend to disapprove of this behavior (Sherrell et al. 1989 , Bailey et al. 2008a . In both of the studies by Bailey et al., in which subjects were asked to rate the seriousness of various potentially problematic behaviors by editors and reviewers, this disapproval was shown (using a factor analysis) to be part of a general and strong disapproval of "selfish or cliquish acts" in the peer review process. Thus it appears that the reason for the disapproval of editors publishing papers by their friends and colleagues is that it shows the editor acting on private interests, rather than displaying the disinterestedness that is the norm in science (Merton 1942) .
On the other hand, if connection bias was a serious worry for authors, one would expect this to be a major consideration for them in choosing where to submit their papers (i.e., submit to journals where they know the editor), but Ziobrowski and Gibler (2000) find that this is not the case. 2 Here, page allocation is used as a proxy for journal editors' willingness to push the paper. The more obvious variable to use here would be whether or not the paper is accepted for publication. Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies which measure the influence of a relationship between the author and the editor on acceptance decisions directly. Presumably this is because information about rejected papers is usually not available in these kinds of studies.
3 In particular, authors who know an editor and thus could expect to profit from con-Moreover, despite working scientists' disapproval, there is some evidence that connection bias improves the overall quality of accepted papers (Laband and Piette 1994 , Medoff 2003 , Smith and Dombrowski 1998 . Does that mean scientists are misguided in their disapproval? As indicated in the introduction, I distinguish between the effects of editors' biases on the authors of scientific papers on the one hand, and the effects on the readers of scientific journals on the other hand. In this section, I use a formal model to show that these two can come apart: connection bias may negatively affect scientists as authors while positively affecting scientists as readers. Note that in this section I focus only on connection bias. Subsequent sections consider other biases.
Consider a simplified scientific community consisting of a set of scientists. Each scientist produces a paper and submits it to the community's only journal which has one editor.
Some papers are more suitable for publication than others. I assume that this suitability for publication can be measured on a single numerical scale. For convenience I call this the quality of the paper. However, I remain neutral on how this notion should be interpreted, e.g., as an objective measure of the epistemic value of the paper (which is perhaps an aggregate of multiple relevant criteria), or as the number of times the paper would be cited in future papers if it was published, or as the average subjective value each member of the scientific community would assign to it if they read it. 4 nection bias would find knowing the editor and the composition of the editorial board more generally to be important factors in deciding where to submit, contrary to Ziobrowski and Gibler's evidence (these factors are ranked twelfth and sixteenth in importance in a list of sixteen factors that might influence the decision where to submit). Similarly, authors who do not know an editor would find a lack of (perceived) connection bias and the composition of the editorial board to be important factors, but these rank only seventh and twelfth in importance in Ziobrowski and Gibler's study. In a similar survey by Mackie (1998, chapter 4) , twenty percent of authors indicated that knowing the editor and/or her preferences is an important consideration in deciding where to submit a paper.
4 For more on potential difficulties with interpreting the notion of quality, see Bright (2015) .
Crucially, the editor does not know the quality of the paper at the time it is submitted. The aim of this section is to show how uncertainty about quality can lead to connection bias. To make this point as starkly as possible, I assume that the editor cares only about quality, i.e., she makes an estimate of the quality of a paper and publishes those and only those papers whose quality estimate is high.
Let q i be the quality of the paper submitted by scientist i. Since there is uncertainty about the quality, q i is modeled as a random variable. Since some scientists are more likely to produce high quality papers than others, the mean µ i of this random variable may be different for each scientist. I assume that quality follows a normal distribution with fixed variance:
The assumptions of normality and fixed variance are made primarily to keep the mathematics simple. Below I make similar assumptions on the distribution of average quality in the scientific community and the distribution of reviewers' estimates of the quality of a paper. I see no reason to expect the results I present below to be different when any of these assumptions are changed.
If the editor knows scientist i, she has some prior information on the average quality of scientist i's work. This is reflected in the model by assuming that the editor knows the value of µ i . For scientists she does not know, the editor is uncertain about the average quality of their work. All she knows is the distribution of average quality in the larger scientific community, which I also assume to be normal:
Note that I assume the scientific community to be homogeneous: the scientific community is split in two groups (those known by the editor and those not known by the editor) but average paper quality follows the same distribution in both groups. If I assumed instead that scientists known by the editor write better papers on average the results would be qualitatively similar to those I present below. If scientists known by the editor write worse papers on average this would affect my results. However, since most journal editors are relatively central figures in their field (Crane 1967) , this would be an implausible assumption except perhaps in isolated cases.
The editor's prior beliefs about the quality of a paper submitted by some scientist i reflects this difference in information. If she knows the scientist she knows the value of µ i , and so her prior is π(
. If the editor does not know scientist i she only knows the distribution of µ i , rather than its exact value. Integrating out the uncertainty over µ i yields a prior
) for the quality of scientist i's paper. When the editor receives a paper she sends it out for review. In the context of this model, the main purpose of the reviewer's report is to provide an estimate of the quality of the paper. But, I assume, even after reading the paper its quality cannot be established with certainty. Thus the reviewer's estimate r i of the quality q i is again a random variable. I assume that the reviewer's report is unbiased, i.e., its mean is the actual quality q i of the paper. Once again I use a normal distribution to reflect the uncertainty:
The editor uses the information from the reviewer's report to update her beliefs about the quality of scientist i's paper. I assume that she does this by Bayes conditioning. Thus, her posterior beliefs about the quality of the paper are π(q i | r i ) if she does not know the author, and π(q i | r i , µ i ) if she does.
The posterior distributions are themselves normal distributions whose 5 The reviewer's report could reflect the opinion of a single reviewer, or the averaged opinion of multiple reviewers. The editor could even act as a reviewer herself, in which case the report reflects her findings which she has to incorporate in her overall beliefs about the quality of the paper. The assumption I make in the text can be used to cover any of these scenarios, as long as a given journal is fairly consistent in the number of reviewers used. If the number of reviewers is frequently different for different papers (and in particular when this difference correlates with the existence or absence of a connection between editor and author) the assumption of a fixed variance in the reviewer's report is unrealistic because a report from multiple reviewers may be thought to give more accurate information (reducing the variance) than a report from a single reviewer.
mean is a weighted average of r i and the prior mean, as given in proposition 1 (for a proof, see DeGroot 2004, section 9.5, or any other textbook that covers Bayesian statistics).
where
When does the editor choose to publish a paper? Here I assume that she publishes any paper whose posterior mean is above some threshold q * . So a paper written by a scientist unknown to the editor is published if µ U i > q * and a paper written by a scientist known to the editor is published if
This corresponds to being at least 50% confident that the paper's quality is above the threshold. Other standards could be used (risk-averse standards might require more than 50% confidence that the paper is above some threshold, while risk-loving standards might require less; in these cases the threshold value needs to be adapted to keep the total number of accepted papers constant) but for my purposes here it does not much matter. Now compare the probability that the paper of an arbitrary scientist i unknown to the editor is published to the probability that the paper of an arbitrary scientist known by the editor is published. For this purpose it is useful to determine the probability distribution of the posterior means (see appendix A for proofs of this and subsequent results).
Proposition 2. The posterior means are normally distributed, with µ
The main result of this section, which establishes the existence of connection bias in the model, is a consequence of proposition 2. It says that the editor is more likely to publish a paper written by an arbitrary author she knows than a paper written by an arbitrary author she does not know, whenever q * > µ (for any positive value of σ 2 sc and σ 2 rv ). Since q * = µ would mean that exactly half of all papers gets published, the condition amounts to a requirement that the journal's acceptance rate is less than 50%. This is true of most reputable journals in most fields (physics being a notable exception). When acceptance rates are above 50% editorial favoritism is also much less of a concern in the first place.
sc > 0, and σ 2 rv > 0, the acceptance probability for authors known to the editor is higher than the acceptance probability for authors unknown to the editor, i.e., Pr µ
Theorem 3 shows that in the model I presented, any journal with an acceptance rate lower than 50% will be seen to display connection bias. Thus I have established the surprising result that an editor who cares only about the quality of the papers she publishes may end up publishing more papers by her friends and colleagues than by scientists unknown to her, even if her friends and colleagues are not, as a group, better scientists than average.
Why does this surprising result hold? The theorem follows immediately from proposition 2, which says that the distribution of µ U i is less "spread out" than the distribution of µ
weighted average of µ and r i , keeping it relatively close to the overall mean µ compared to µ K i , which is a weighted average of µ i and r i (which tend to differ from µ in the same direction).
Because the editor treats papers by authors she knows differently from papers by authors she does not know, authors unknown to the editor are arguably harmed. I pick up this point in section 3 and argue that this constitutes an epistemic injustice against those authors.
What I have shown so far is that an editor who uses information about the average quality of papers produced by scientists she knows in her acceptance decisions will find that scientists she knows produce on average more papers that meet her quality threshold. This is a subjective statement: the editor believes that more papers by scientists she knows meet her threshold. Does this translate into an objective effect? That is, does the extra information the editor has available about scientists she knows allow her to publish better papers from them than from scientists she does not know?
In order to answer this question I need to compare the average quality of accepted papers. More formally, I want to compare the expected value of the quality of a paper, conditional on meeting the publication threshold, given that the author is either known to the editor or not. 
Proposition 4 shows that the editor can use the extra information she has about scientists she knows to improve the average quality of the papers published in her journal. In other words, the surprising result is that the editor's connection bias actually benefits rather than harms the readers of the journal. It is thus fair to say that, in the model, the editor can use her connections to "identify and capture high-quality papers", as Laband and Piette (1994) suggest. 6 To what extent does this show that the connection bias observed in reality is the result of editors capturing high-quality papers, as opposed to editors using their position of power to help their friends? At this point the model is seen to yield an empirical prediction. If connection bias is (primarily) due to capturing high-quality papers, the quality of papers by authors the editor knows should be higher than average, as shown in the model. If, on the other hand, connection bias is (primarily) a result of the editor accepting for publication papers written by authors she knows even though they do not meet the quality standards of the journal, then the quality of papers by authors the editor knows should (presumably) be lower than average.
If subsequent citations are a good indication of the quality of a paper, 7 a simple regression can test whether accepted papers written by authors with an author-editor connection have a higher or a lower average quality than papers without such a connection. This empirical test has been carried out a number of times, and the results univocally favor the hypothesis that editors use their connections to improve the quality of published papers (Laband and Piette 1994 , Smith and Dombrowski 1998 , Medoff 2003 . Note that in the above results, nothing depends on the sizes of the variances σ 2 qu , σ 2 sc , and σ 2 rv . This is because these results are qualitative. The variances do matter when the acceptance rate and average quality of papers are compared quantitatively. For example, reducing σ 2 rv (making the reviewer's report more accurate) makes the differences in the acceptance rate and average quality of papers smaller.
Note also that the results depend on the assumption that σ 2 sc and σ 2 rv are positive. What is the significance of these assumptions?
If σ 2 rv = 0, i.e., if there is no variance in the reviewer's report, the reviewer's report describes the quality of the paper with perfect accuracy. In this case the "extra information" the editor has about authors she knows is not needed, and so there is no difference in acceptance rate or average quality based on whether the editor knows the author. But it seems unrealistic to expect reviewer's reports to be this accurate.
If σ 2 sc = 0 there is either no difference in the average quality of papers produced by different authors, or learning the identity of the author does not tell the editor anything about the expected quality of that scientist's work. In this case there is no value to the editor (with regard to determining the quality of the submitted paper) in learning the identity of the author. So here also there is no difference in acceptance rate or average quality based on whether the editor knows the author.
Under what circumstances should the identity of the author be expected to tell the editor something useful about the quality of a submitted paper? This seems to be most obviously the case in the lab sciences. The identity of the author, and hence the lab at which the experiments were performed, can increase or decrease the editor's confidence that the experiments were performed correctly, including all the little checks and details that are impossible to describe in such a paper. In a scientific paper, "[a]s long as the conclusions depend at least in part on the results of some experiment, the reader must rely on the author's (and perhaps referee's) testimony that the author really performed the experiment exactly as claimed, and that it worked out as reported" (Easwaran 2009, p. 359) .
But in other fields, in particular mathematics and some or all of the humanities, there is no need to rely on the author's reputation. This is because in these fields the paper itself is the contribution, so it is possible to judge papers in isolation of how or by whom they were created. Easwaran (2009) discusses this in detail for mathematics, and briefly (in his section 4) for philosophy. And in fact there exists a norm that this is how they should be judged: "Papers will rely only on premises that the competent reader can be assumed to antecedently believe, and only make inferences that the competent reader would be expected to accept on her own consideration." (Easwaran 2009, p. 354) .
Arguably then, the advantage (see theorem 3 and proposition 4) conferred by revealing identity information about the author to the editor applies only in certain fields. The relevant fields are those where part of the information in the paper is conferred on the authority of testimony, in particular those where experimental results are reported. Even in those fields, of course, what is being testified is supposed to be reproducible by the reader. But this is still different from the case in mathematics and the humanities, where a careful reading of a paper itself constitutes a reproduction of its argument. In these latter fields there is no relevant information to be learned from the identity of the author (i.e., σ 2 sc = 0), or, at least, the publishing norms in these fields suggest that their members believe this to be the case.
Bias As an Epistemic Injustice
The previous section discussed a formal model of editorial uncertainty about paper quality. The first main result, theorem 3, established the existence of connection bias in this model: authors known by the editor are more likely to see their paper accepted than authors unknown to the editor. The second main result, proposition 4, showed that connection bias benefits the readers of the journal by improving the average quality of accepted papers.
Despite the benefit to the readers, I claim that authors are harmed by connection bias. In this section I argue that an instance of connection bias constitutes an epistemic injustice in the sense of Fricker (2007) . Then I argue that the editor is likely to display other biases as well, and that instances of these also constitute epistemic injustices.
The type of epistemic justice that is relevant here is testimonial injustice. Fricker (2007, pp. 17-23 ) defines a testimonial injustice as a case where a speaker suffers a credibility deficit for which the hearer is ethically and epistemically culpable, rather than being due to innocent error.
Testimonial injustices may arise in various ways. Fricker is particularly interested in what she calls "the central case of testimonial injustice" (Fricker 2007, p. 28) . This kind of injustice results from a negative identity-prejudicial stereotype, which is defined as follows:
A widely held disparaging association between a social group and one or more attributes, where this association embodies a generalization that displays some (typically, epistemically culpable) resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective investment. (Fricker 2007, p. 35) Because the stereotype is widely held, it produces systematic testimonial injustice: the relevant social group will suffer a credibility deficit in many different social spheres.
Applying this to the phenomenon of connection bias, it is clear that this is not an instance of the central case of testimonial injustice. This would entail that there is some negative stereotype associated with scientists unknown to the editor, as a group, which is not normally the case. So I set the central case aside (I return to it below) and focus on the question whether connection bias can produce (non-central cases of) testimonial injustice.
Suppose scientist i and scientist i tend to produce papers of the same quality, which is above average in the population (µ i = µ i > µ). Suppose further that the actual papers they have produced on this occasion are of the same quality (q i = q i ) and have received similar reviewer reports (r i = r i ). If scientist i is not known to the editor, but scientist i is, then the paper written by scientist i is likely to be evaluated more highly by the editor.
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If the publication threshold q * is somewhere in between the two evaluations then only scientist i will have her paper accepted. In this example, the scientists produced papers of equal quality that were evaluated differently. So scientist i suffers a credibility deficit. This deficit is not due to innocent error, as it would be if, e.g., random variation led to different reviewer reports (i.e., r i < r i ). The deficit is also not due to the editor's use of generally reliable information about the two scientists, as it would be if there was a genuine difference in the average quality of the papers they produce (i.e., µ i < µ i ).
Is this credibility deficit suffered by scientist i ethically and epistemically culpable on the part of the editor? On the one hand, as I stressed in section 2, the editor is simply making maximal use of the information available to her. It just so happens that she has more information about scientists she knows than about others. But that is hardly the editor's fault: she cannot be expected to know everyone's work. Is it incumbent upon her to get to know the work of every scientist who submits a paper?
This may well be too much to ask. But an alternative option is to remove all information about the authors of submitted papers. This can be done by using a triple-blind reviewing procedure, in which the editor does not know the identity of the author, and hence is prevented from using information about scientists she knows in her evaluation. Using such a procedure, at least all scientists are treated equally: any scientist who writes a paper of a given quality has the same chance of seeing that paper accepted.
So a credibility deficit occurs which harms scientist i: her paper is rejected. Moreover, it harms her specifically as an epistemic agent: the rejection of the paper reflects a judgment of the quality of her scientific work. And 8 The editor's posterior mean for the quality of scientist i's paper is µ U i and her posterior mean for scientist i 's paper is µ
The claim in the text is then justified by the fact that Pr(σ this harm could have been prevented by the editor by using a triple-blind reviewing procedure.
I conclude that the editor is ethically and epistemically culpable for this credibility deficit, and hence a testimonial injustice is committed against scientist i. However, one may insist that it cannot be the case that the editor is committing a wrong simply in virtue of using relevant information that is available to her. An evidentialist in particular may say that it cannot possibly be an epistemic wrong to take into account all relevant information.
I disagree, for the reasons just given, but I need not insist on this point. Even if it is granted that the editor does not commit an injustice by using the information that is available to her, the end result is still that scientist i is harmed as an epistemic agent. She has produced a paper of equal quality to scientist i 's, and yet it is not published.
Moreover, the presence of scientist i is irrelevant. Any time a paper from an author unknown to the editor is rejected which would have been accepted had the editor known the author (all else being equal), that author is harmed. So even if one insists that differential editorial treatment resulting from connection bias is not culpable on the part of the editor, connection bias still harms authors whenever it influences acceptance decisions.
In the model of section 2, and the above discussion, I assumed that connection bias is the only bias journal editors display. The literature on implicit bias suggests that this is not true. For example, "[i]f submissions are not anonymous to the editor, then the evidence suggests that women's work will probably be judged more negatively than men's work of the same quality" (Saul 2013, p. 45) . Evidence for this claim is given by Wennerås and Wold (1997) , Valian (1999, chapter 11) , Steinpreis et al. (1999) , Budden et al. (2008) , and Moss-Racusin et al. (2012) .
9 So women scientists are at a disadvantage simply because of their gender identity. Similar biases exist based on other irrelevant aspects of scientists' identity, such as race or sexual orientation (see Lee et al. 2013 , for a critical survey of various biases in the peer review system). As Crandall (1982, p. 208) puts it: "The editorial process has tended to be run as an informal, old-boy network which has excluded minorities, women, younger researchers, and those from lower-prestige institutions". I use identity bias to refer to these kinds of biases. Any time a paper is rejected because of identity bias (i.e., the paper would have been accepted if the relevant part of the author's identity had been different, all else being equal), a testimonial injustice occurs for the same reasons outlined above. Moreover, here the editor is culpable for having these biases.
Unlike instances resulting from connection bias, testimonial injustices resulting from identity bias can be instances of the central case of testimonial injustice, in which the credibility deficit results from a negative identity-prejudicial stereotype. The evidence suggests that negative identityprejudicial stereotypes affect the way people (not just men) judge women's work, even when the person judging does not consciously believe in these stereotypes. Moreover, those who think highly of their ability to judge work objectively and/or are primed with objectivity are affected more rather than less (Uhlmann and Cohen 2007 , Stewart and Payne 2008 , p. 1333 . Similar claims plausibly hold for biases based on race or sexual orientation. Biases based on academic affiliation are not usually due to negative identityprejudicial stereotypes, as these do not generally affect other aspects of the scientist's life.
So both connection bias and identity bias are responsible for injustices against authors. This is one way to spell out the claim that authors are harmed when journal editors do not use a triple-blind reviewing procedure. This constitutes the first kind of argument for triple-blind reviewing which I mentioned in the introduction, and which I endorse based on these consid-erations.
The Effect of Bias on Quality
The second kind of argument I mentioned in the introduction claims that failing to use triple-blind reviewing harms the journal and its readers, because it would lower the average quality of accepted papers. In section 2 I argued that connection bias actually has the opposite effect: it increases average quality. In this section I complicate the model to include identity bias.
Recall that the editor displays identity bias if she is more or less likely to publish papers from a certain group of scientists based on some aspect of their identity, e.g., their gender. I incorporate this in the model by assuming the editor consistently undervalues members of one group (and overvalues the others). More precisely, she believes the average quality of papers produced by any scientist i from the group she is biased against to be lower than it really is by some constant quantity ε. Conversely, the average quality of papers written by any scientist not belonging to this group is raised by δ.
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So the editor has a different prior for the two groups; I use π A to denote her prior for the quality of papers written by scientists she is biased against, and π F for her prior for scientists she is biased in favor of.
As before, the editor may be familiar with a given scientist's work (i.e., she knows the average quality of that scientist's papers) or not. So there are now four groups. If scientist i is known to the editor and belongs to the stigmatized group the editor's prior distribution on the quality of scientist i's
If scientist i is known to the editor but is not in the stigmatized group the prior is π
10 This is a simplifying assumption: one could imagine having biases against multiple groups of different strengths, or biases whose strength has some random variation, or biases which intersect in various ways (Collins and Chepp 2013, Bright et al. 2016) . However, the assumption in the main text suffices to make the point I want to make. It should be fairly straightforward to extend my results to more complicated cases like the ones just described. 
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The next few steps in the development are analogous to that in section 2. After the reviewer's report comes in the editor updates her beliefs about the quality of the paper, yielding the following posterior distributions.
Proposition 5.
As before, the paper is published if the posterior mean (µ
The respective distributions of the posterior 11 Note that I assume that the editor displays bias against scientists in the stigmatized group regardless of whether she knows them or not. Under a reviewing procedure that is not triple-blind, the editor learns at least the name and affiliation of any scientist who submits a paper. This information is usually sufficient to determine with reasonable certainty the scientist's gender. So at least for gender bias it seems reasonable to expect the editor to display bias even against scientists she does not know. Conversely, because negative identity-prejudicial stereotypes can work unconsciously, it does not seem reasonable to expect that the editor can withhold her bias from scientists she knows. means determine how likely this is. These distributions are given in the next proposition.
Proposition 6. The posterior means are normally distributed, with
This yields the within-group acceptance rates and the unsurprising result that the editor is less likely to publish papers by scientists she is biased against.
Theorem 7.
If ε > 0, δ > 0, and σ 2 rv > 0, the acceptance probability for authors the editor is biased against is lower than the acceptance probability for authors the editor is biased in favor of (keeping fixed whether or not the editor knows the author). That is,
Theorem 7 establishes the existence of identity bias in the model: authors that are subject to a negative identity-prejudicial stereotype are less likely to see their paper accepted than authors who are not. As I argued in section 3, whenever a paper is rejected due to identity bias this constitutes a testimonial injustice against the author. Now I turn my attention to the effect that identity bias has on the average quality of accepted papers. In the current version of the model there is both connection bias and identity bias. Connection bias has been shown to have a positive effect on average quality (see section 2). Whether the net effect of connection bias and identity bias is positive or negative depends on various parameters, as I illustrate below.
The benchmark for judging the average quality of accepted papers under a procedure subject to connection bias and identity bias is a triple-blind reviewing procedure under which the editor is not informed of the identity of the scientist. As a result, she is both unable to use information about the average quality of a given scientist's papers and unable to display bias against scientists based on their identity.
Under this triple-blind procedure, the editor's prior distribution for the quality of any submitted paper is π(q i ) ∼ N (µ, σ 2 qu +σ 2 sc ), i.e., the prior I used in section 2 when the author was unknown to the editor. Hence, under this procedure, the posterior is π(q i | r i ), the posterior mean is µ
, the probability of acceptance is Pr(µ U i > q * ) and the average quality of
In contrast, I refer to the reviewing procedure that is subject to connection bias and identity bias as the non-blind procedure. The overall probability that a paper is accepted under the non-blind procedure depends on the relative sizes of the four groups. I use p KA to denote the fraction of scientists known to the editor that she is biased against, p KF for the fraction known to the editor that she is biased in favor of, p U A for unknown scientists biased against, and p U F for unknown scientists biased in favor of. These fractions are nonnegative and sum to one.
Let A i denote the event that scientist i's paper is accepted under the nonblind procedure. The overall probability of acceptance under this procedure is
The average quality of accepted papers can then be written as
, the average quality of accepted papers under a triple-blind procedure.
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In the remainder of this section I assume that the editor's biases are such that she believes the average quality of all submitted papers to be equal to µ. In other words, her bias against the stigmatized group is canceled out on average by her bias in favor of those not in the stigmatized group, weighted by the relative sizes of those groups:
I use the above equation to fix the value of δ, reducing the number of free parameters by one. The equation amounts to a kind of commensurability requirement for the two procedures because it guarantees that the editor perceives the average quality of submitted papers to be the same regardless of whether or not a triple-blind procedure is used.
As far as I can tell there are no interesting general conditions on the parameter values that determine whether the non-blind procedure or the triple-blind procedure will lead to a higher average quality of accepted papers. The question I will explore now, using some numerical examples, is how biased the editor needs to be for the epistemic costs of her identity bias to outweigh the epistemic benefits resulting from connection bias.
In order to generate numerical data values have to be chosen for the parameters. First I set µ = 0 and q * = 2. Since quality is an interval scale in this model, these choices are arbitrary. For the variances σ 2 qu , σ 2 sc , and σ 2 rv , I choose a "small" and a "large" value (1 and 4 respectively).
For the sizes of the four groups, I assume that there is no correlation between whether the editor knows an author and whether the editor has a bias against that author (so, e.g., the percentage of women among scientists the editor knows is equal to the percentage of women among scientists the editor does not know). I consider two cases for the editor's identity bias: either she is biased against half the set of authors (and so biased in favor of the other half) or the group she is biased against is a 30 % minority.
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Similarly, I consider the case in which the editor knows half of all scientists submitting papers, and the case in which the editor knows 30 % of them.
As a result, there are 32 possible settings of the parameters (2 3 choices for the variances times 2 2 choices for the group sizes). Whether the triple-blind procedure or the non-blind procedure is epistemically preferable depends on the value of ε (and the value of δ determined thereby). It follows from proposition 4 that when ε = 0 the non-blind procedure helps rather than harms the readers of the journal by increasing average quality relative to the triple-blind procedure. If ε is positive but relatively small, this remains true, but when ε is relatively big, the non-blind procedure harms the readers. This is because the average quality of published papers under the non-blind procedure decreases continuously as ε increases (I do not prove this, but it is easily checked for the 32 cases I consider).
The interesting question, then, is where the turning point lies. How big does the editor's bias need to be in order for the negative effects of identity bias on quality to cancel out the positive effects of connection bias?
I determine the value of ε for which the average quality of published papers under the non-blind procedure and the triple-blind procedure is the same for each of the 32 cases. But reporting these numbers directly does not seem particularly useful, as ε is measured in "quality points" which do not have a clear interpretation outside of the model.
To give a more meaningful interpretation of these values of ε as measuring "size of bias", I calculate the average rate of acceptance of papers from authors the editor is biased against and the average rate of acceptance of papers from authors the editor is biased in favor of.
14 The difference between these numbers gives an indication of the size of the editor's bias: it measures (in percentage points, abbreviated pp) how many more papers the editor accepts from authors she is biased in favor of, compared to those she is biased against. This difference is reported for the 32 cases in figure 1. To provide a sense of scale for these numbers, I plot them against the acceptance rate that the triple-blind procedure would have for those values of the parameters, i.e., Pr(µ
Already with this small sample of 32 cases, a large variation of results can be observed. I illustrate this by looking at two cases in detail.
First, suppose that σ 2 qu = σ 2 sc = 1 and σ 2 rv = 4. In this extreme case the triple-blind procedure has an acceptance rate as low as 0.72 %. If the groups are all of equal size (p KA = p KF = p U A = p U F = 1/4) then under the non-blind procedure the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased in favor of needs to be as much as 2.66 pp higher than the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased against, in order for the average quality under 14 These are calculated without regard for whether the editor knows the author or not. In particular, the rate of acceptance for authors the editor is biased against is
is the rate of acceptance for authors the editor is biased in favor of.
Figure 1: The minimum size of the editor's bias such that the quality costs of the non-blind procedure outweigh its benefits (given as a percentage point difference in acceptance rates), in 32 cases, plotted as a function of the acceptance rate of the corresponding triple-blind procedure.
the two procedures to be equal. Clearly a 2.66 pp bias is very large for a journal that only accepts less than 1 % of papers. If the bias is any less than that there is no harm to the readers in using the non-blind procedure. Second, suppose that σ 2 qu = σ 2 sc = 4 and σ 2 rv = 1. Then the tripleblind procedure has an acceptance rate of 22.66 %. If, moreover, the editor knows relatively few authors (p KA = p KF = 0.15, p U A = p U F = 0.35) then the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased in favor of needs to be only 2.23 pp higher than the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased against, in order for the quality costs of the non-blind procedure to outweigh its benefits. For a journal accepting about 23 % of papers that means that even if the identity bias of the editor is relatively mild the journal's readers are harmed if the non-blind procedure is used.
Based on these results, and the fact that the parameter values are unlikely to be known in practice, it is unclear whether the non-blind procedure or the triple-blind procedure will lead to a higher average quality of published papers for any particular journal.
15 So in general it is not clear that an argument that the non-blind procedure harms the journal's readers can be made. At the same time, a general argument that the non-blind procedure helps the readers is not available either. Given this, I am inclined to recommend a triple-blind procedure for all journals because not doing so harms the authors.
If there was reason to believe that the editor's bias was very small, there might be a case for the non-blind procedure using considerations of average quality. Based on the empirical evidence I cited in section 3, it seems unlikely that any editor could make such a case convincingly today. But if identity bias were someday to be eliminated or severely mitigated, this question may be worth revisiting.
So far I have argued in this section that in the presence of the positive effect of connection bias on quality, the net effect of connection bias and identity bias on quality is unclear. But I argued in section 2 that the positive effect of connection bias may only exist in certain fields. In fields where papers rely partially on the author's testimony there is value in knowing the identity of the author. But in other fields such as mathematics and some of the humanities testimony is not taken to play a role-the paper itself constitutes the contribution to the field-and so arguably there is no value in knowing the identity of the author.
In those fields, then, there is no quality benefit from connection bias, but there is still a quality cost from identity bias. So here the strongest case for the triple-blind procedure emerges, as the non-blind procedure harms both authors and readers.
Conclusion
In this paper I have considered two types of arguments for triple-blind review: one based on the consequences for the author and one based on the consequences for the readers of the journal.
I have argued that the non-blind procedure introduces differential treatment of scientific authors. In particular, editors are more likely to publish papers by authors they know (connection bias, theorem 3) and less likely to publish papers by authors they apply negative identity-prejudicial stereotypes to (identity bias, theorem 7). Whenever a paper is rejected as a result of one of these biases an epistemic injustice (in the sense of Fricker 2007) is committed against the author. This is an argument in favor of triple-blinding based on consequences for the author.
From the readers' perspective the story is more mixed. Generally speaking connection bias has a positive effect on the quality of published papers and identity bias a negative one. Thus whether the readers are better off under the triple-blind procedure depends on how exactly these effects trade off, which is highly context-dependent, or so I have argued. This yields a more nuanced view than that suggested by either Laband and Piette (1994) , who focus only on connection bias, or by the argument for triple-blinding based on the consequences for the readers, which focuses only on identity bias.
However, in mathematics and some of the humanities there is arguably no positive quality effect from connection bias, as knowing about an author's other work is not taken to be relevant (Easwaran 2009 ). So here the negative effect of identity bias is the only relevant consideration from the readers' perspective. In this situation, considerations concerning the consequences for the author and considerations concerning the consequences for the readers point in the same direction: in favor of triple-blind review.
A The Acceptance Probability and the Average Quality of Papers
The latter can be used straightforwardly to determine the distribution of µ
The result follows because µ is a constant and
Determining the distribution of µ K i is slightly trickier because there are two random variables involved: r i and µ i . As noted above,
it remains to determine the convolution of X i and µ i . This can be done using the moment-generating function and the law of total expectation. Recall that the moment-generating function of an N (m, s 2 ) distribution is given by
which is exactly the moment-generating function of the desired normal distribution. Finally, note that Proof. It follows from proposition 2 that
where Φ is the distribution function (or cumulative density function) of a standard normal distribution. Since Φ is (strictly) increasing in its argument, and σ K > σ U by proposition 2, the theorem follows immediately.
In order to prove proposition 4 a number of intermediate results are needed.
Proof. Because µ U i is simply an (invertible) transformation of r i , it follows that
The distribution of q i | µ K i is a little trickier to find, because µ K i is a linear combination of two random variables, r i and µ i , and it is not obvious that learning µ K i is as informative as learning both r i and µ i . But using the known distributions of q i | µ i and µ K i | q i , µ i and integrating out µ i it can be shown that
The important point here is that E[q i | µ 
Here
for all x ∈ R, where φ is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution, and Φ is its distribution function. R is the inverse of what is known in the literature (e.g., Gordon 1941) as Mills' ratio.
It follows from the definitions that R(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R and that
Proposition 9 (Gordon (1941) ). For all x > 0, R(x) <
Proposition 9 can be used to establish the next result. 
The equalities follow from the distributions of the posterior means established in proposition 6. The inequality follows from the fact that Φ is strictly increasing in its argument. By the same reasoning,
Lemma 11.
Pr (
Proof. The expression for Pr(A i ) follows immediately from the distributions of the posterior means established in proposition 6. To get an expression for E[q i | A i ], consider first the average quality of scientist i's paper given that it is accepted and given that scientist i is in the group of scientists known to the editor that the editor is biased against. This average quality is
where the first equality simply rewrites the inequality µ
KA i
> q * in a more convenient form, the second equality uses lemma 8, and the third equality uses equation 1. Similarly,
The average quality of accepted papers E[q i | A i ] is a weighted sum of these expectations. The weights are given by the proportion of accepted papers that are written by a scientist in that particular group. For example, authors known to the editor that she is biased against form a p KA Pr(µ 
